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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTORY FILING
FEE APPLIED TO INDIGENT PERSON AS A
CONDITION PRECEDENT TO DISCHARGE
IN BANKRUPTCY HELD VIOLATIVE OF
EQUAL PROTECTION
It was a widse man who said that there is no greater inequality than the
equal treatment of inequats.*

In In re Smith' a three-judge federal district court held
that a statutory requirement compelling an indigent person
filing a petition in bankruptcy to pay the filing fee, as a
condition precedent to being entitled to an order of discharge,2
violated equal protection.
In support of her petition to file in forma pauperis, the
petitioner made both statutory and constitutional arguments.
The court rejected the statutory argument which was based
on the contention that since the Bankruptcy Act did not
specifically prohibit such petitions and in view of its remedial
purpose3 the Act should be construed to permit application
of the federal in forma pauperis statute.4 In its opinion, the
court noted that Congress had repealed in forma pauperis
bankruptcy proceedings in 1946,r and that from the beginning,
the bankruptcy system was expected to be self-supporting.,
* Frankfurter, Felix in Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 184 (1950).
1. 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971). Because petitioner's memorandum
raised questions concerning the proper construction and the constitutionality
of the Bankruptcy Act, the court gave notice to the Attorney General of the
United States, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 2403 (1964). Thereafter, the
United States entered the proceeding as amicus curiae and filed a brief in opposition to the motion.
2. 11 U.S.C. 32 (b), (c) (8), 68 (c) (1), 95 (g) (1964).
3. See Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1917). "The federal
system of bankruptcy is designed not only to distribute the property of the
debtor, not by law exempted, fairly and equally among his creditors, but as a
main purpose of the act, intends to aid the unfortunate debtor by giving him a
Our decisions lay great stress upon this
fresh start in life, free from debts....
feature of the law-as one not only of private, but of public interest in that
it secures to the unfortunate debtor who surrenders his property for distribution,
a new opportunity in life."
4. 25 U.S.C. 1915 (1964).
5. 11 U.S.C. 68 (a)(1964).
6. 323 F.Supp. 1082, 1085 (D. Colo. 1971). See also Note, Bankruptcy
Proeecdings In Forma Pauperis, 69 COLUm. L. REv. 1203, 1206 (1969).
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The court found, therefore, that Congress intended to abolish
in forma pauperis proceedings in bankruptcy and rejected
the petitioner's claim that she was entitled to file under the
federal in forma pauperis statute:
It would be unreasonable to conclude that Congress intended to grant
through the earlier in forina pauperis [sic] statute what it specifically
denied in a later version of the Bankruptcy Act or that Congress
intended to leave room for the judiciary to create a common law right.
The statutory guide to construction that the specific governs the general seems to us most likely to reflect what Congress intended.7

Thus, according to the court in Smithb, there is no statutory right to file in forma pauperis in bankruptcy proceedings,
nor is there any common law right to such a proceeding.
The court did, however, rule that the filing fee requirement, as a condition precedent to obtaining an order of
discharge, was violative of the fifth amendment right of due
process. In so holding, the court noted that the fifth amendment does not include the equal protection clause to be found
in the fourteenth amendment, applicable only to the states.8
Even so the court recognized that fifth amendment due process, which is applicable to the federal government, does include an equal protection principle and based its holding on
the conclusion that the federal Bankruptcy Act's filing fee
requirement denied to indigents the equal protection of the
laws and was thus violative of the fifth amendment. 9
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE INDIGENT

In the recent Supreme Court case of Boddie v. Connecticut,10 Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, said:
, [Gliven the basic position of the marriage relationship in this
society's heirarchy of values and the concomitant state monopolization
of the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due process does
prohibit the State from denying, solely because of inability to pay,
access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their
marriages.1 1
* .

In basing its decision on a denial of due process, the
Court noted that the state exercised a complete monopoly as
7. 323 F. Supp. 1082, 1085 (D. Colo. 1971).
8. Id. See also Boyden v. Commissioner, 441 F2d 1041, 1044 n.5 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) and cases cited therein.
9. 323 F. Supp. 1082, 1085 (D. Colo. 1971).
10. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
11. Id. at 374.
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to the legitimate means of resolving private disputes as they
relate to the dissolution of allegedly untenable marriages. 12
Thus, although they assert here due process rights as would-be plaintiffs, we think appellants' plight, because resort to state courts is the
only avenue to dissolution of their marriages, is akin to that of defendants faced with exclusion from the only forum effectively empowered to settle their disputes. Resort to the judicial process by these
plaintiffs is no more voluntary in a realistic sense than that of the
defendant called upon to defend its interest in court.13

It is well established that due process requires, absent
a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, that
persons forced to settle their disputes through the judicial
process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.1 4
The requirement is not one of an actual hearing on the merits,
but rather of an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time and in an appropriate ;manner. 15 "In short, 'within the
limits of practicality,' Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, &
Trust Co., ... a State must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard if it is to fulfill the promise
of the Due Process Clause."'16 Such opportunity for a hearing
must be afforded before the individual is deprived of any
significant property interest, except where some valid government interest is at stake that justifies postponing the
hearing until after the event.1 7
It is also well established that a statute, valid on its face
and enacted in the exercise of some legitimate state power,
may be held constitutionally invalid as applied to a specific set
of facts when it operates to deprive an individual of a constitutionally protected right. "[T]he right to a meaningful
12. Id. at 376.

13. Id.
14. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
15. Id. See also Armstrong v. Mango, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). What the
Constitution does require "is an opportunity... granted at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner" for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.
16. 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
17. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961). Deprivation of right of access to military installation for security
reasons. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselbury, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950). Administrative decision to remove misbranded articles from retail outlets (multiple seizures) based on a finding of probable cause, without a hearing, held
not to be violative of due process. See also Fakey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245
(1947); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); and Yokus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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opportunity to be heard... must be protected against denial
by particular laws that operate to jeopardize it for particular
individuals."' 8 In Mullane the Court held that in a proceeding
for judicial settlement of accounts by the trustee of a common
trust fund, statutory notice by newspaper publication, while
sufficient as to those beneficiaries whose interests or whereabouts could not with due diligence be ascertained, was
insufficient and did not satisfy the requirements of due process as to known beneficiaries of a known place of residence.' 9
By analogy, the Court, in Boddie reasoned as follows:
Just as a generally valid notice procedure may fail to satisfy due
process because of the circumstances of the defendant, so too a cost
requirement, valid on its face, may offend due process because it
operates to foreclose a particular party's opportunity to be heard. The
State's obligations under the fourteenth amendment are not simply
generalized ones; rather the State owes to each individual that process
which, in light of the values of a free society can be characterized
20
as due.

Counsel for the State of Connecticut, the appellee in
Boddie, argued that the state had a substantial interest in the
use of the fee and cost requirements in question to prevent
frivolous litigation and to allocate scarce judicial resources.
The Court, however, found none of these considerations sufficient to override the interest of the appellants in having
access to the only legitimate means of dissolving their allegedly untenable marriages. The Court further pointed
out that there was no logical connection between a litigant's
assets and the seriousness of his motives in bringing suit,
and that other alternatives exist to fees and cost requirements
as a means of conserving the court's time and protecting
parties from frivolous litigation. 2'1 Returning to a familiar
theme, the court concluded that an individual's wealth should
not determine his ability to gain access to the state's judicial
machinery particularly when there exist no private law alternatives. In rejecting the state's asserted interest in its fee
and costs requirement as a method of cost recoupment, the
18. 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).

19. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).

See also Corey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S.

141 (1956), wherein notice by publication was held not to satisfy the requirements of due process where the defendant was a known incompetent.

20. 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971).
21. Id. at 381. For example: penalties for false pleadings or affidavits.
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Court relied upon Griffin v. Illinois,22 wherein the cost of a
transcript beyond the means of the indigent blocked access
to the appellate judicial process. In Griffin the Court rejected
the state's contention that its interest in the financial integrity of the system which provided the transcript service
justified the imposition of the statutory fee on criminal
appellants, even if in some cases such imposition resulted
in the denial of access to the appellate process.
In concluding, the Court in Boddie attempting to limit
the holding to what the Court perceived to be the determinative factors in its reasoning, said:
[W]e do not decide that access for all individuals is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment so that its exercise may not be placed beyond the reach of any
individual, for, as we have already noted, in the case before us this
right is the exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a fundamental
human relationship. The requirement that these appellants resort to the
23
judicial process is entirely a state-created matter.

Thus, in basing its decision on a denial of due process,
the Court was constrained to find, first, that marriage is "a
fundamental human relationship" in our society and, second,
that there is a constitutionally significant distinction between
the state's monopoly of the judicial process and attendant
enforcement machinery as it applies to divorce actions, and
as it applies to any other action arising under state or federal
law.
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND THE INDIGENT

Both Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan, in
concurring opinions in Boddie, expressed dismay at the
grounds upon which the court based its decision. The two
Justices felt that the cases decided upon the equal protection
principles developed by Griffin and its progeny seemed more
analogous to the Boddie case than the due process grounds
used by the court in reaching its decision in Boddie.2 4 In
22. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
23. 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971).
24. See Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961), wherein the Court held
that requiring indigents to pay filing fees before a writ of habeas corpus could
be considered in a state court was invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.
See also Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), wherein the Court invalidated
a statute providing that a state supreme court would consider cases only if the
filing fee had been paid.
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Boddie Connecticut had provided statutory requirements for
obtaining a divorce, one of which was the payment of costs
and notice fees. The result of this requirement was obviousthe more affluent could obtain a divorce, the indigent could
not. To Justices Douglas and Brennan, Boddie clearly presented a factual situation to be decided under the Equal
Protection Clause. Mr. Justice Douglas further criticized the
Court's reasoning by pointing out that "whatever residual
element of substantive law the Due Process Clause may still
have [Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U. S. 199 (1960)] it essentially regulates procedure." 25 Also, the historical due process
test of whether the right claimed is "of the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty" 26 has proved to be highly subjective
27
and dependent upon the idiosyncracies of individual judges.

While it is true that the scope of the Equal Protection
Clause is not definable with exact precision, rather definite
guidelines have been developed. Several classifications have
been recognized as invidiously discriminatory: race28 is one,
aliens 29 another, religion30 another, and poverty31 still another.
In Boddie the invidious discrimination was based on one of
these guidelines-poverty. Thus, Mr. Justice Douglas felt
that:
Just as denying further judicial review in Burns and Smith, appellate
counsel in Douglas and a transcript in Griffin created an invidious distinction based on wealth, so too does the making of grant or denial
of a divorce to turn on the wealth of the parties. Affluence does not
,pass muster under the Equal Protection Clauses for determining who
must remain married and who shall be allowed to separate. 32
DOES THE ANALYSIS AFFECT THE RESULT?

Thus the debate continues as to how the Court will expand
the indigent's opportunities to participate more fully in our
25. 401 U.S. 371, 384 (1971).
26. Palko v. Connecticut, 202 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
27. See Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) ; Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); and Lockner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
28. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). Stranden v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
29. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U. S.410 (1948).
30. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
31. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
32. 401 U.S. 371, 386 (1971). Cites for the cases noted in the excerpt are
more fully set out as follows: Smith v. Bennett and Burns v. Ohio note 24
supra; Griffin v. Illinois note 22 supra; and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963).
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society. Some say that the end of the equal protection road
is the egalitarian redistribution of wealth, 83 while others fear
that the due process approach will never effectively insure the
indigent's rights to full participation in a consumer oriented
society. 4
The question that immediately comes to mind is, what is
the real difference between the two approaches or is there
any? Upon examination of the due process approach as
formulated by Mr. Justice Harlan, one of the strongest critics
of the "new" equal protection doctrine, one finds that his
formulation is virtually identical to the equal protection
approach he so vigorously disdained. Harlan's due process
analysis of discriminatory legislation focuses on "the rationality of the connection between legislative means and purposes,
the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose, and the degree of confidence we may have that the
statute reflects the legislative concern for the purpose that
would legitimately support the means chosen." 35 Thus, the
crucial question for Harlan became the arbitrariness of the
classification, which is very much an equal protection kind of
question. Harlan maintained the presumption of legislative
rationality, but would have given special scrutiny to legislation
involving a "basic liberty." This approach sounds very much
like the "suspect criteria" and "compelling governmental
interest" aspect of the equal protection approach, and, therefore, just as susceptible to objection as being too subjective
and subject to the whims of individual judges in determining
what are fundamental rights as the test Harlan attacked. It
would seem that the determination of a "basic liberty" would
be equally subjective and subject to the whims of individual
judges as would the determination of a "fundamental right." 36
On the other hand, Justice Harlan's list of basic liberties was
apparently a completed list, to be found in the Bill of Rights
33. See Michelna, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. Rnv. 7 (1969).
34. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383-86 (1971)

(Douglas,

J.

concurring).

35. Williams v.
36. Mr. Justice
majority for basing
(1971). He further

Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
Douglas made this very point in criticising the Boddie
its decision on due process grounds. 401 U.S. 371, 385
pointed out that some definite invidiously discriminatory

classifications had already developed making equal protection analysis less sub-

ject to the idiosyncracies of individual judges than the due process approach.
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and the precedents of the Court, and to that extent his approach would have an objectivity not to be found in the equal
protection analysis. Therefore, although there appears to be
little difference in principled analysis between the due process
and the equal protection approaches, the extent to which the
egalitarian ideal is realized may be limited by the due process
approach, depending on the extent to which one accepts or
rejects the notion of a definitive list of "basic liberties."
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS

The incorporation of the notion of fundamental rights,
which has long been basic to due process analysis, in an equal
protection case is well illustrated by the recent district court
case of In re Smith.3 7 In Smith the court noted that under
traditional equal protection theory the Bankruptcy Act's
filing fee requirement would be constitutional, because all
persons, regardless of circumstances, were required to pay
the same fee. Numerically equal and otherwise reasonable
treatment which has the effect of denying something to the
poor has not been considered in itself to work an invidious
discrimination. 38 The Supreme Court in Harper v. Board of
Elections3 9 concluded that voting was a fundamental right
which once granted could not be conditioned upon an individual's wealth or lack of it. The Court, in so holding, characterized voting as preservative of all rights. Implicit in the
Court's holdings in Harper,Griffin and Shapiro v. Thompso, 40
is the judgment that when a fundamental interest is involved,
equal protection is denied even if performance of a service is
conditioned upon payment of a fee which supports the provision of that service. Thus, what the Court requires when a
"fundamental right" is involved is a kind of proportional
equality. That is, absent some compelling or overriding state
interest, the Court requires differences in the treatment of
persons in accordance with differences in their circumstances
37. 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971).

38. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); but see Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
39. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).

40. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Wherein the Court held that statutory prohibition
of welfare benefits to residents of less than a year created a classification which
constitutes an invidious discrimination denying them equal protection of the
laws.
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when equal treatment would result in a restriction upon the
exercise of a fundamental right or interest by a legislatively,
judicially or administratively created classification of people.
The court in Smith agreed with the government's contention that bankruptcy is not a fundamental right but viewed
the crucial issue not simply as a constitutional right to the
remedy of bankruptcy but rather, as access to the judicial
process.4 1 The court noted, that in holding the bankruptcy
filing fee violative of equal protection, it disagreed with the
result reached on the constitutional issue by the first circuit
in In re Garland.42 In Garland, however, the court viewed
bankruptcy not as a court proceeding, but rather as a governmental service, for which the recipient should pay.
If there were substantial injury involved, this financial loss might
have to be suffered. We do not find such injury. A bankruptcy
discharge is not a fundamental right... [WIhile this may basically be
a question of meeting the expense of operating the system, we do not
think it inappropriate for Congress to determine, from a social point
of view, that one who is receiving the privilege of avoiding his past,
and by hypothesis, legitimate debts, should experience some slight
43
burden in return.

The Smith court in assessing the constitutionality of
requiring a fee for discharge in bankruptcy, viewed the
resultant deniel of access to the court, in the case of indigent
bankrupts, as a denial of a fundamental right.44 Just as the
Supreme Court in Harper found voting to be "fundamental"
because it is preservative of all rights, it is patently obvious
that access to the judicial process could as easily and justly
be characterized as preservative of all rights and therefore
fundamental.
41. 323 F. Supp. 1082, 1087 (D. Colo. 1971).
42. 428 F.2d 1185 (1970).
43. Id. at 1187. In its paternalistic moralizing to the consumer bankrupt
in Garland, the first circuit appears to have completely overlooked the pratical
effect of the filing fee requirement. Since the bankrupt gives up all of his nonexempt assets for distribution among his creditors, requiring a filing fee from
such a bankrupt causes him to suffer no burden. In reality it only reduces the
total fund available for distribution among his creditors, thus shifting this
"burden" to the creditors. The effect of the decision in Garlandis to deny to
those bankrupts who do not have non-exempt assets sufficient to cover the
mandatory filing fee, that which is granted as a matter of right to all other
petitioners. Under the Garland ruling, the determinative test for granting a
discharge in bankruptcy is whether or not one has sufficient assets to cover
the filing fee.
44. 323 F. Supp. 1082, 1086 (D. Colo. 1971).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 7

1972]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

325

Filing fees, of course, were once much more common

than they are today, and apparently they were never considered to impose too great a burden on the indigent's right to
access to the court. In Smith, however, the Colorado District

Court did not regard itself as bound by historical notions of
what may or may not have been an unconstitutional burden
upon access to court. In support for this position the court
quoted from Harper:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory
of a particular era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally
discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions of
equality.. •. Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes
of the Equal Protection Clause do change.45

Even so, the court noted that the only other federal court
to decide the issue presented was the first circuit in In re
Garland. The Smith court was unable to accept the first
circuit's analysis of the issue.
We disagree that the interest of an assetless person is necessarily less
important that the interest of one who has $50 for a filing fee and few,
or no, assets to be divided among creditors. The petitioner in this
case states as her reason for seeking bankruptcy a desire to escape
the embarrassment and strain of creditor harassment, and we think it
of
inappropriate and even impossible to second guess the precise nature
46
the interests and motives which Congress intended to protect.

The Garland court and the government in Smith were

concerned with the costs of requiring in forma pauperis petitions in bankruptcy. The Smith court noted that the federal

government would be allowed to make a classification otherwise violative of equal protection if it showed a compelling

interest in so doing, but pointed out that Shapiro, Griffin and
Harper:
*.. [S]uggest that the Supreme Court would not view fiscal integrity,
or in the case of bankruptcy, Congress' intent that the system be selfsupporting, as a compelling interest. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
that fiscal integrity could ever be described as a compelling interest in
47
other than grave financial conditions.
CRIMINAL-CIVIL DISTINCTIONS

It should be kept in mind that while many of the cases
expanding the indigen's right of access to court have been
45. 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
46. 323 F. Supp. 1082, 1090 (D. Colo. 1971).
47. Id. at 1088.
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criminal cases, the equal protection clause, as well as the due
process clause, applies to both civil and criminal cases. The
technical distinction between civil and criminal cases should
be of no importance in determining which constitutional
rights will be protected. The Supreme Court has not felt
bound by formal distinctions, but has applied the notions of
equal protection to some proceedings traditionally considered
civil.48 The classic example of this application of equal protec49
tion analysis to civil matters is Harperv. Board of Elections,
wherein the Court concluded that a state law making payment
of a fee a prerequisite to voting was violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
While there is a difference betwen civil and criminal
cases in that the state is not always the moving party in civil
cases, none of the equal protection cases have focused on the
state's direct involvement in the case.
Instead the Court focused on the deficiences of procedures whereby
rich litigants received more . .. than did poor litigants. Court procedures which of themselves invidiously discriminate between rich
and poor impair guarantees of equal justice which the Constitution was
designed to protect. 50

Thus, equal protection analysis should not be concerned
with labels, but rather with the relative deprivations created
or sanctioned by statute and court procedures.
Conclusion
There are many as yet unsolved and complex questions
involved in expanding the promise of the Constitution to include the participation of all our citizens in the exercise of
those rights and interests considered to be fundamental,
without regard for classifications based upon wealth. Not the
least of these problems is the fact that suggested standards
as they exist more readily solve cases of flagrant injustice,
but are difficult to apply and become increasingly subjective
as the equities are more evenly balanced. What is needed are
standards responsive to the great variety of cases and situations which will arise in the future. In setting such standards
48. See Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969) (right of free transcript extended to habeas corpus) ; and Zane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)
(right of free transcipt extended to coram nobis).

49. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
50. Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891, 901-02 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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it will be the Court's approach to the problems and the ultimate decision as to the extent that equal protection prohibits
state created classifications based upon wealth which will be
determinative of the establishment of individual and class
justice in the United States. It is incumbent upon the Supreme
Court to articulate such stAndards and upon the lower courts
to apply the equal protection and due process standards of recent cases, and those yet to come, to state provision of services
considered to affect fundamental rights or interests. The time
for the further articulation of such standards and their vigorous application to the remaining vestiges of state sanctioned
relative deprivations is now. If the constitutional promise of
equal protection and due process is to be realized, the courts
must not fear the articulation and application of standards
resulting in badly needed social reform. Where fundamental
rights or interests are jeopardized by legislation or its application in a particular case, it is the court's duty to engage
in the "social reform" necessary to protect those rights or
interests without regard for the wealth or indigency of the
person or persons so threatened.
JAMES M. GRIFFIN
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